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Abstract: 
    Purpose 
    – This is the first paper which aims to investigate factors that might influence the gender 
composition of boards of directors of Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A‐REITs). 
 
    Design/methodology/approach 
    – This study follows Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno and Nieto and the gender diversity literature and 
investigates the existence and number of women directors on the boards of directors of 37 A‐REITs 
from 2006 to 2011. 
 
    Findings 
    – There is evidence that larger (by market capitalization) A‐REITs are more likely to employ a 
woman director and that A‐REITs with larger boards are more likely to employ a woman director and 
indeed more women directors. It also appears that A‐REITs whose head office is in Sydney are more 
likely to employ a woman director and also more women directors. 
 
    Practical implications 
    – Women seeking to be engaged as directors of A‐REITs are more likely to be employed by larger 
A‐REITs (by market capitalization), those with larger boards and those located in Sydney. 
 
    Originality/value 
    – This paper adds to the existing literature on gender diversity by examining the factors that appear 
to influence the employment of women on A‐REIT Boards. 
 
Introduction 
In the last 20 years, there has been a growing volume of literature arguing that companies would 
benefit substantially by engaging women on company boards of directors (Burke, 1994, 1997, 2003; 
Bilimoria, 2000; Singh et al., 2001; Stephenson, 2004; Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Van der Walt et al., 
2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011). While some of the argument emphasizes the social 
justice dimension of engaging women on boards, much of the argument presents a business case that 
suggests women have a valuable knowledge of consumers, consumer markets and corporate social 
responsibility, which can assist firms to perform better both financially and as corporate citizens. 
There is some empirical evidence in Farrell and Hersch (2005) that finds women do tend to serve on 
better financially performing boards and Gul et al. (2011) suggest that more firm‐specific information 
is reflected in the stock prices of firms that have gender‐diverse boards. They explain that this is 
because gender diversity is positively linked with “[…] increasing voluntary public disclosures in 
large firms and increasing the incentives for private information collection in small firms” (Gul et al., 
2011, p. 336). In another recent study, Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that gender diversity is 
positively linked to board effectiveness. They also suggest that gender diversity has “[…] a positive 
impact on the performance in firms that otherwise have weak governance,” although the empirical 
evidence is not entirely clear (Adams and Ferreira, 2009, p. 308). 
 
While the gender composition of many industry sectors that generally employ a substantial number of 
women (such as banking, retailing health and media) have been investigated (Mateos de Cabo et al., 
2012; Singh et al., 2001; Adams and Ferreira, 2009), the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) sector 
has had little attention and this paper thus aims to make a contribution to the literature. We examine 
and empirically investigate the existence and the number of women directors on the boards of 
Australian REITs and investigate factors that influence this. 
 
Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A‐REITs) manage around $150 billion of institutional 
grade property assets, constituting around 50 per cent of all property assets under management in 
Australia (PIR, 2011). The A‐REIT sector is the largest property investment sector in Australia, 
managed by around 40 entities and the second largest REIT market, by market capitalization, in the 
world (Macquarie Securities, 2011). A‐REITs also constitute about 6 per cent of the market 
capitalization of the Australian Stock Exchange at November 2012. Additionally, major institutions 
and superannuation funds such as ING, Vanguard and Colonial First State have significant sums of 
money invested in these A‐REITs. Newell (2007) also confirms the importance of industry‐based 
super funds to A‐REITs. 
 
The A‐REIT sector also had an outstanding track record of performance (Newell, 2006; Newell and 
Peng, 2006; Lee et al., 2007, 2008) and as such, had a rapid growth in assets under management from 
2003 (assets under management of $80 billion) to 2008 (assets under management of over $200 
billion) (PIR, 2011). The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes some 
related literature and our hypotheses. Section 3 reports the findings. Section 4 contains our 
conclusions. 
Related literature and hypotheses 
Despite the arguments in favour of more women directors, Catalyst (2012) still reports a relatively 
low proportion of women directors on corporate boards internationally. Women directors average 
around 12 per cent of board size (ranging from 0.1 per cent in Saudi Arabia to 40.1 per cent in 
Norway). Interestingly, three Scandinavian countries top the list on the proportion of women directors 
on boards of listed companies. Catalyst (2012) reports Norway at the top, following legislation 
requiring that women occupy 40 per cent of board seats on publicly listed entities from January 2008. 
Next are Sweden and Finland with 27.3 and 24.5 per cent, respectively, of the public company board 
seats being held by women (without the passing of any legislation). The USA, UK and Australia are 
reported at 16.1, 15.0 and 8.4 per cent (although Australia has in November 2012 reported that 
women hold 12.3 per cent of the board seats of the S&P/ASX200 company directorships, according to 
the Australian Census of Women in Leadership (2012)). Catalyst (2012) references various sources 
for these percentages but generally they refer to a “top 200” or “top 500” type index of listed 
companies that constitute the largest companies in the country by market capitalization in a variety of 
industry sectors. 
 
In exploring theoretical explanations regarding these low proportions of women directors, Singh and 
Vinnicombe (2003, 2004) suggest that women directors have similar corporate backgrounds and 
experience to their male directors, which their male director counterparts regard as useful and 
important. They deny that women lack ambition or commitment. Another explanation is propounded 
by Sheridan (2002), who suggests that the low proportional representation of women on boards could 
simply be because women may not have had enough influential contact with existing board members. 
 
Regrettably, there is only one REIT industry paper in this gender board composition area by 
Dimovski and Brooks (2005) and they find that property trust initial public offerings (IPOs) in 
Australia generally do not require female directors for the successful capital raising and listing; and 
that larger REIT IPOs tend to engage more women directors. Because of this lack of board gender 
literature in the REIT industry sector specifically; we rely on the broader corporate governance and 
accounting and finance literature for much of the following discussion. 
 
In regard to the empirical gender composition literature, the size of companies appears to be important 
to the numbers and existence of women directors. Catalyst (2004) and Hyland and Marcellino (2002) 
in the USA and Singh et al. (2001) in the UK, all found that larger companies (measured by market 
capitalization and/or by revenues) had a greater percentage of board seats filled by women. Amongst 
the stakeholder literature, Luoma and Goodstein (1999) argue that larger firms are subject to greater 
public scrutiny and need to be seen to be doing the “right thing”. As such, it might be expected that 
these larger firms need to be seen to have a higher percentage of board seats filled by women. The 
numbers and proportion of women directors also appear to be significantly related to the industry 
sector in which companies operate. Hyland and Marcellino (2002) identify that the construction and 
manufacturing sectors have been male‐dominated and unlikely to engage women directors, while 
Singh et al. (2001) suggest that the retailing and banking sectors, where a great many women are 
employed, are likely to employ more women directors. In a sample set of 54 of the top 500 companies 
in Australia, Dimovski and Brooks (2006) find that the mining industry employs far fewer women 
directors than industrial companies employ. The relationship between board size and women directors 
has also been empirically examined. Carter et al. (2003) find that the number and proportion of 
women directors on boards increases with board size. That is, bigger boards tend to have more 
women. 
 While the above relationships regarding women directors are known, what is not known is whether 
firm or board size influences the number of women directors in this significant industry sector, 
namely, the A‐REIT sector. The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis to be tested in the 
Australian environment: 
 
H1. The presence of and the number of women directors on an A‐REITs board is positively related to 
the size of the company and the size of the board. 
 
Additionally, the study examines other factors that may influence the presence of and the number of 
women directors on A‐REIT boards. First, the big 4 accounting firms have all identified the potential 
of women to make a substantial positive impact on business. Indeed Deloitte (2011) and PWC (2012) 
have recently been involved in board gender studies to highlight the issue more widely. Second, the 
return on assets and price earnings ratio variables will test whether better performing firms are more 
likely to engage women directors. It is generally perceived that higher returns on assets and a higher 
price earnings ratio reflect a higher future performance potential. 
 
Third, the “price to book ratio” is often used to reflect growth opportunities – the higher the market 
values the firm compared to its book value the higher the market believes in the firm growing, while 
the debt to equity ratio reflects the leverage of the firm. A recent study by Adams and Funk (2012) 
suggests that women may have a higher disposition to risk than men. Since the trust portion of the 
REIT's income is required to be paid out in full to unit‐holders, growth is often financed with debt. 
Additionally, stapled securities entities suggest a corporation is involved (with a trust) to generally 
engage in property development activities. These activities are likely more risky than the simple rent 
collection from properties (through trusts). 
 
The city of Sydney is Australia's most populated city and is the head office home to most of the A‐
REITs in the country. This variable tests whether there is a geocentric basis for engaging women 
directors. Mateos de Cabo et al. (2012) investigate if there is a country specific effect amongst 
European banks. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses to be tested in the Australian 
environment: 
 
H2. The use of a big 4 accounting firm undertaking the audit has positively influenced the A‐REIT 
into hiring more women directors. 
 
H3. A higher return on assets and price earnings ratio positively influences A‐REITs into hiring more 
women directors and to take advantage of their knowledge of consumers and consumer markets more 
broadly. 
 
H4. The higher the price to book ratio and the higher the debt to equity, the higher the growth 
opportunities and more risky the firm and hence the more likely these firms might be in influencing 
the appointment of female directors. The stapled security entities may also be more likely to have 
more female directors. 
 
H5. More qualified and capable female directors seeking to be involved as directors are likely to be 
available in the location where the vast majority of A‐REITs operate. 
 
Findings 
A total of 37 A‐REITs were identified through the “Connect 4 Boardroom” and “DatAnalysis” 
databases during 2006‐2011, with two or more years of gender and company data. This resulted in 
203 (yearly) observations over this six‐year period, giving an average of about 5.5 observations per 
REIT. Table I reports A‐REIT summary characteristics for the whole period. The mean average 
number of male directors (Men) in any one year for these A‐REITs was 5.843 (with a minimum of 
one man and a maximum of 12 men in any one year) while the average number of female directors 
(women) in any one year was 0.498 (with a minimum of none and a maximum of two in any one year. 
The standard deviation of the number of women directors and men directors was 0.646 and 2.272, 
respectively. The engagement of a woman director at all (as a binary variable of 0 if no women 
engaged, or 1 if there was one or more women on the board) occurred in 41.9 per cent of the 203 
observation years. So if the gender composition of women directors in any one‐year for A‐REITs was 
investigated, it would be likely that less than half of these entities would have a woman director at all. 
The proportion of women directors as part of the board was 7 per cent, while for men it was 93 per 
cent. For some REIT boards, men constituted 100 per cent of the entire board while one REIT board 
had a 50:50 split. The market capitalization averaged $2.17 billion for these A‐REITs. Westfield 
Group has always been the largest and had the highest capitalization of $40.6 billion in 2007. 
 
Over the period, the average number of executive directors in any one year was 1.4, while the average 
number of non‐executive directors was 4.9 (ranging from zero to five and zero to 11, respectively, 
over the period). There are no women executive directors; they are all men. These A‐REITs also 
engaged a top four accounting firm (big 4 auditor) in nearly 90 per cent of the 203 observational 
years. The big 4 accounting firms are PwC, Deloitte, KPMG and Ernst & Young. 
 
Some often‐used financial measures are also investigated for these entities over the six‐year period. 
The average return on assets (ROA) was around 4.1 per cent; the market price of the securities (price 
to book) averaged 0.837, while the price earnings ratio (PER) averaged 9.28 and the debt to equity 
ratio (Debt to equity) averaged 0.92. The range of values for these ratios was large, given that some of 
the data related to the pre global financial crisis years of 2006 and 2007, while the 2008 and 2009 
years were quite devastating for some A‐REITs. 
 
It is also worth noting that most of these entities have their head office in Sydney, Australia (71 per 
cent). Additionally around 62 per cent of them use stapled securities (Stapled) where units in a trust 
(generally earning passive rental income) are linked with shares in a company (generally involved in 
property development activities) and cannot be sold separately. The other 38 per cent generally utilize 
the unit trust structure and earn passive rental income. 
 
Table II reports the average yearly summary statistics over the years 2006‐2011. It appears the 
average number of men on the board has fallen from around 6.26 to around 5.24 while the average 
number of women has risen from 0.48 to nearly 0.68. This also suggests the average size of the board 
has fallen from 6.7 people to 5.9 people. The binary existence of a woman on the board has climbed 
from 0.39 to 0.49. In 2006 the proportion of men on boards was 94 and women 6 per cent. In 2011 
this proportion has moved to 90 and 10 per cent, respectively. The number of executive directors has 
fallen slightly from 1.48 to 1.35 while the number of non‐executive directors has also fallen from 5.1 
to 4.57. It also appears these A‐REITs are more recently more likely audited by one of the big 4 
accounting firms with 95 per cent of them being audited by a big 4 firm in 2011 while 87 per cent of 
them where audited by one of the big 4 in 2006. 
 
The market capitalizations and financial ratios in Table II now more clearly identify the impact of the 
global financial crisis period. Fairly high returns on assets and price to book and price earnings ratios 
in 2006 and 2007 fell dramatically in 2008 and 2009, although they began to rise again in 2010 and 
2011. The average debt to equity ratios appear low in 2006 and 2007, because high asset values have 
crept up in 2010 and 2011 with the decreases in these asset values. Market capitalization averages 
appear to have about halved from 2007 to 2011 (from an average $3.3 billion entity to a $1.7 billion 
entity). 
 
Tables III and IV partition the average data into security type and head office location, respectively. 
There were 22 (of the 37) stapled security REITs, which are generally internally managed, that appear 
to be more likely to have a woman on the board and proportionally more women than those that are 
not stapled. They appear to be larger (by market capitalization) and have had higher returns on assets, 
and to command a higher market price to book value. 
 
A total of 26 of the A‐REITs had their head office in Sydney. These entities were generally larger (by 
market capitalization but this is highly influenced by Westfield Group) also, and while there was little 
difference in the returns on assets or price to book, the number of women and the likelihood of having 
a woman on the board appears much higher for these entities than for those with head offices in other 
Australian cities. 
 
Two models are used to explore the relationship between women directors and various explanatory 
variables. The first model examines factors influencing the existence of a woman director on the 
board (binary 1 – yes and 0 – no). A panel random effects logit is utilized. The next model uses the 
number of women directors (in a panel random effects Poisson regression) as the dependent variable. 
A total of 203 observations over six years for 37 A‐REITs are examined. The independent variables 
examined are defined as follows: 
 
mktcapmil The market capitalization of the A‐REIT in millions of dollars (Singh et al., 2001; Hyland 
and Marcellino, 2002). 
 
total The number of directors on the board (Carter et al., 2003). 
 
big4audit A (0 or1) variable with a value of 1 if the REIT was audited by PwC, Deloitte, KPMG and 
Ernst and Young, 0 otherwise (adapted from Dimovski and Brooks (2004)). 
 
roa The percentage return on assets (Mateos de Cabo et al., 2012). 
 
pricetobook The ratio of market price of the REIT to its book value. 
 
per The price earnings ratio of the REIT. 
 
debttoeq The ratio of debt to equity (Mateos de Cabo et al., 2012). 
 
headofficesyd A (0 or1) variable with a value of 1 if the REIT had its head office in Sydney, 0 
otherwise (Mateos de Cabo et al., 2012). 
 
stapled A (0 or1) variable with a value of 1 if the REIT had uses stapled securities, 0 otherwise. 
 
Table V reports the results of the models that test whether the existence of a women director at A‐
REITs is explained by the factors discussed above. The log likelihood and Wald tests as appropriate is 
also reported in each model and suggest the model specifications are useful. A panel fixed effects 
logit is run to investigate the changes within each of the A‐REITs, followed by a panel random effects 
logit and then a Hausman test to determine whether the panel random or panel fixed logit was more 
appropriate. The Hausman test suggests the panel random logit is more appropriate (χ2 5.58 and 
probability 0.472). The table reports the coefficient and p‐value results from this panel random effects 
logit. Panel A shows the mktcapmil and total (board size) variables are useful. This suggests that 
bigger firms by market capitalization and board size were more likely to employ a woman director. 
Likewise, those A‐REITs whose head office is located in Sydney were more likely to engage a 
woman director than those A‐REITs located in other cities. Interestingly and contrary to our 
hypothesis, the price to book ratio is negatively related to the presence of a woman director and those 
A‐REITs with higher growth opportunities are less likely to engage a female director. This might 
reflect the conservativeness of pricing within this sector. A second regression is also run in Panel B to 
investigate the results with fewer explanatory variables. The explanatory variable results are robust. 
 
A second model was run to investigate factors influencing the number of women directors on the 
board. Table VI reports the results of the panel random effects poisson model. In this model, Panel A 
identifies that the size of the board is a useful predictor of the number of women directors on the 
board, in that the larger the board the more likely more women directors are employed. Similarly, the 
Sydney head office variable again declares its importance. It appears that if the A‐REIT's head office 
is located in Sydney, the more likely more women directors are employed. Panel B reports the results 
of another regression with fewer explanatory variables. Board size and location remain useful. 
 
Conclusion 
This study is the first panel data study relating to the existence and the number of women directors on 
the boards of REITs. The study examines 37 A‐REITs during 2006‐2011, culminating in 203 yearly 
observations. The presence and numbers of women directors on REIT boards have gone up slightly 
from 2006 to 2011. Around 39 per cent of the A‐REITs had a woman director in 2006, while around 
49 per cent of them had a woman director in 2011. The proportion of women directors in these entities 
in total only averages around 7.0 per cent, which is slightly lower than the large company average 
proportion of women directors in Australia, but this has risen to 10 per cent in 2011. This suggests 
that the board management of A‐REITs appears to remain a male domain. It also appears that board 
sizes for these entities have decreased from nearly seven directors in 2006, to six in 2011. While the 
global financial crisis has had an impact on most of the market capitalizations and financial ratios, the 
vast majority continue to use a big 4 accounting firm as their auditor (87 per cent in 2006 to 95 per 
cent in 2011), and the vast majority (over 70 per cent) operate their head office from Sydney. 
 
In line with other international findings is the fact that larger A‐REITs (by market capitalization) and 
those with larger boards are more likely to have a woman director. However, only those that have 
larger boards are more likely to have more women on their boards. The geocentric nature of Sydney is 
also particularly interesting in that those REITs that have their head office location in Sydney are 
more likely to have a woman on the board, and more likely to have more women on the board. 
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